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'Dicta Observes

f

A committee of students from the University of Denver School of
Law has requested and received permission to "take over" our May issue.
The Editors have allowed that committee the' responsibility of selecting
and editing the material herein presented, all of which was written by
members of the Senior Class.

DIVORCE--STALEMATE
By ALFRED HEINICKE, School of Law, 1939, Denver
University
OR many years the Colorado legislature struggled to
make more certain the status of those who had taken
steps to receive divorces a vinculo matrimonii, and to
provide that the uncertain period between the first findings
and the final decree be not extended unreasonably, nor the
parties be suspended indefinitely between the married status
and the unmarried because of the whim of one of the parties.
Chapter 90, S. L. 1925, page 237, attempted to empower the court to issue a final decree upon application of the
guilty party to take care of that situation; for example, where
a wife had sued her husband for divorce a vinculo and findings
had been entered in her favor, entitling her to a decree at or
after six months, yet had not availed herself of that right.
The act sought to make status more definite by allowing the
husband to ask that the wife be given her final decree.1
Chapter 91, page 327, of the Session Laws of 1929, was
an effort to make the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law entered on a petition for divorce operate as a decree of
divorce after six months from entry thereof, if within that
period nothing was done to set aside the findings.'
Finally by the 1933 Session Laws, page 440, the legislature provided for interlocutory decrees of divorce and gave
such interlocutory decrees the full sanction accorded to judg1'25 act and '29 act discussed in Cartier v. Cartier, 88 Colo. 76; see also Laizure
v. Baker, 91 Colo. 292, and cases in note 2.
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final without any
ments, the mere lapse of time
2 to make them
further action of the court.
The 1933 act went further to declare it Coloradb's public
policy that rights be rendered certain and that public welfare
demanded that divorce actions be finally determined within a
reasonable time after the trial,' i. e. that parties to a divorce
action be not overlong neither finally divorced nor truly married.
Yet the same legislature embedded in our statutory law
that anomalous divorce known as divorce a mensa et thoro,
or limited divorce.4 A divorce which throws the 'parties to it
back on society in the undefined and dangerous character of a
wife without a husband and a husband without a wife, and
in the words of Vernier, has as its primary effect a destruction
of the right of cohabitation, and as its chief characteristic that
it does not destroy the marriage.5
"Thus it leaves the parties in the position of unmarried persons, in
relation to each other, deprived of the pleasures and freed from the duties
incident upon cohabitation. Yet, as to the rest of the world, they are
still married * * * requiring a degree of chastity scarcely to be expected in an ordinary mortal, for it leaves neither party free to marry
again 5and is no defense to a criminal charge, either of bigamy or adultery." "This
proceeding is, while destitute of justice, one of the most corrupting devices ever imposed by serious natures on blindness and credulity. It was tolerated only because men believed as a part of their
religion, that dissolution would be an offense against God; whence the
slope was easy toward any compromise with good sense; and as the fruit
of compromise we have this ill begotten monster of divorce amensa et
thoro, made up of pious doctrine and worldly stupidity. In almost
every place where marriage is known, this folly walks with her-the
queen and the slut, the pure and the foul, the bright and the dark, dwell
together." 6

The Colorado Act 7 gives the right to maintain an action
for divorce a mensa et thoro to the wife, upon any ground
'For holdings based on this statute see Kastner v. Kastner, 55 P. (2d) 947, and
Morris v. Probst, 55 P. (2d) 944 (also discusses 1925 and '29 provisions).
'Morris v. Probst, supra.
'Session Laws 1933, chapter 72; C. S. A. chapter 56, sections 25-32.
'Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. II, page 341.
'Joel Prentus Bishop, New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce and Separation,
Vol. 1, sec. 68, quoted in Vernier, supra, sec. 114.
'C. S. A. chapter 56, sections 25-32. It is perhaps trivial to note that the act
placing this divorce (among other things) in our statutes was declared so necessary for
immediate preservation of public peace, health and safety that an emergency existed and
that a "safety clause" was attached to make it immediately effective.
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provided by law for divorce or where the wife has been abandoned by the husband without just cause or excuse, and a reconciliation is not probable and it would be just or proper to
grant such relief and upon any ground generally recognized in
equity.
What is the justification for this divorce in Colorado,
where reconciliation is promoted by the use of interlocutory
decrees, where the other advantages of such divorce may be had
under a decree of absolute divorce without the injustice of a
limited divorce? If the act is based on religious feelings against
divorce a vinculo, why is the right given only to wives, or is it
that wives are more religious in Colorado?
Suppose a case where a husband and wife are incompatible: Certainly no one longer believes that in divorces the guilt
is all on one side and virtue all on the other (although Colorado still holds that if both parties are guilty they shall remain
in holy deadlock).8 But suppose an "innocent" wife obtains
a limited divorce from her "guilty" husband and has received
what property' she wishes and custody of the children. She
may be fairly content with her life and also determined that
her husband shall remain a husband, yet not a husband. Why
otherwise the limited divorce?
While the act of '33 does provide that the decree of separation a mensa et thoro shall not bar either of the parties from
subsequently bringing and maintaining an action for divorce,
and the wife could, if she wished, obtain an absolute divorce
on the same grounds that she obtained her limited divorce,
assuming the original grounds were sufficient for absolute divorce, what can the "guilty" husband do? He has no grounds
that existed before his wife's decree (having been declared the
guilty party). Certainly his grounds must arise after her
decree, and perhaps his wife is careful to see that he has no
grounds; she may even lead a chaste and proper life. She is in
the position of a wife, yet under no personal duties to her
husband, a wife who may live apart from her husband and yet
not be guilty of desertion, although her repentant husband
may ask her to come back.1
'C. S. A. chapter 56, section 7.
'See C. S. A. chapter 56, section 28.
"Williams v. Williams (an Arizona case), 265 P. 87, 61 A. L. R. 1264.

110

DICTA

The husband is denied the freedom from the bonds of
matrimony while he is cut off from association with his wife
and children and exposed to their indifference and perhaps
hatred. The wrong done him is not a legal one for which the
law affords redress, for presumptively his own wrongful conduct brought about his altered status.'" Nor may he seek a
more congenial companion for another attempt at being a good
husband.'
In all fairness it is difficult to see why these sociologically
unhealthy situations should be allowed to arise in Colorado
and to be fostered by our statutes, when Colorado has been
progressive enough to abolish action for breach of promise,
alienation of affections, and civil actions for seduction.
It is true that Colorado, by the decisions of its courts,
has long allowed an action for separate maintenance or alimony without divorce, 2 but it is to be questioned whether
the action is entitled to the further sanction of a statute. It is
"An interesting point is also raised by S. L. '33, chapter 72, section 6; C. S. A.
chapter 56, section 30. providing, as to separate maintenance decrees, that such a decree
granted in this state shall not be defeated or affected, or barred in any way, by any
decree of divorce obtained by one of the parties in some other state or country, if no
personal service within such state or country was had upon the party adversely affected
by such decree of divorce, and if such party did not presonally appear in such action:
and such decree of divorce so obtained shall not be used as a bar or estoppel to, or be
admitted in evidence in any proceeding to enforce, or concerning, affecting, or involving
in any way such decree of separate maintenance. Evidently a wife who has received a
Colorado separate maintenance decree may, if it so please her, later obtain a divorce in
another state, yet, under certain conditions, still sue in Colorado on the separate maintenance decree without fear of her husband submitting her foreign divorce decree by
way of estoppel or bar.
"See Daniels v. Daniels, 9 Colo. 133, 10 P. 657, a Supreme Court case holding
alimony to be within the jurisdiction of courts of equity independently of statute and
to be a relief which might be granted although no divorce was prayed; Hanscom v.
Hanscom (1895), 6 C. A. 97, 39 P. 885, saying a court of equity independent of
statute has jurisdiction to award alimony, even when no divorce is sought; Dye v. Dye
(1897), 9 C. A. 320, 48 P. 313, holding a wife may maintain a suit in equity to compel payment of alimony where separate maintenance is the only relief prayed, and that
the power in equity to entertain such a suit by a wife is not affected by S. L. 1893,
making neglect of a wife a misdemeanor and providing punishment therefor: In re
Popejoy (1899), 26 Colo. 32, 77 Am. St. Rep. 222, 55 P. 1083, holding it settled
by the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals that an action
for separate maintenance may be maintained and that the wife, in a proper case, is entitled
to a judgment for separate maintenance though she does not seek or wish a legal separation a vinculo: Austin v. Austin (1908), 42 Colo. 130, 94 P. 309, cited in notes 38
L. R. A. (NS) 594, Ann. Cases 1912A 938, Ann. Cases 1916A 857, 6 A. L. R. 70,
81, 40 A. L. R. 1240, holding a district court has jurisdiction of a suit by a wife for
separate maintenance independently of a divorce action or of a criminal proceeding for
the husband's failure to provide reasonable support; Fahey v. Fahey, 43 Colo. 354,
96 P. 251, 127 Am. St. Rep. 118, 18 L. R. A. (NS) 1147, holding it is settled in
this state that a wife may maintain an action against her husband for separate maintenance independent of an action for divorce.
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submitted that rather than perpetuate the right, it would be

better to eliminate it.
The first mention of the action that I have been able to
find in the Colorado statutes is in the rather indefinite provisions in the general divorce statute of 1917,"3 amended in part

in 1927,14 unrepealed by the 1933 statute and still existing in
our law. This seems merely a lefthanded and perhaps unconscious recognition of the action as existing and affects only
procedural matter therein."
There is a difference, of course, between divorce a mensa
et thoro and separate maintenance, but to my mind it has become almost indistinct, certainly the decisions are confused.
Ballentine's College Law Dictionary defines divorce a mensa
et thoro as "a divorce which operated as a mere temporary separation, leaving all the other marital rights and obligations in
full force during the life of the parties and being subject to the
complete restoration of the marital status by reconciliation.
In the ecclesiastical courts proceedings for such a divorce
sought a separation for causes arising after the marriage and
admitted the validity of the marriage;" and separate maintenance as "the condition or status of a married woman who is
13S. L. 1917, chapter 65, section 2, paragraph 3 (Compiled Laws '21, section
5594: C. S. A., chapter 56, section 3).
In any action for separate maintenance the
answer of the defendant shall contain: 1. A general or specific denial of each material
allegation in the complaint intended to be controverted by the defendant. 2. A statement of any new matter constituting a defense or constituting an action for divorce, in
ordinary and concise language, without unnecessary repetition. The section also deals
with jurisdiction as to divorce and separate maintenance.
S. L. 1917, chapter 65, section 6. (C. L. sec. 5598; C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 7.)
In any action for divorce the defendant may file a cross complaint in which may be set
forth any one or more causes for divorce or separate maintenance against the plaintiff;
and if upon the trial of such action, both parties shall be found guilty of any one or
more of the causes of divorce, then a divorce shall not be granted to either of said parties.
14S.
L. 1927, chapter 93, sec. 2 (C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 3), entitled "an act
amending 5594, concerning divorce and alimony." provides that the district court shall
have jurisdiction of all actions for separate maintenance and the county court of such
actions for separate maintenance where the complaint avers that the plaintiff does not
ask or seek alimony in excess of $2,000. (This provision also repeated in section 3,
S. L. '33, chap. 72, C. S. A. chap. 56, sec. 27).
"In any action for divorce and alimony or for separate maintenance, the answer
of the defendant shall contain: 1. A general or specific denial of each material allegation
in the complaint intended to be controverted by the defendant. 2. A statement of any
new matter if any is relied on constituting a defense or constituting an action for divorce
or separate maintenance in ordinary and concise language without unnecessary repetition.
"Except as in C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 7, supra, which provides that if both parties
are guilty there is to be no divorce. Possibly in such case there can be a decree of separate
maintenance if asked for in the cross complaint.
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living apart from her husband and is being supported by him,
but without being divorced from him."
Perhaps the best discussion of the difference between the
two is found in an Arizona case of Williams v. Williams, 6 in
which the court says a husband may sue his wife for absolute
divorce on the grounds of desertion after she has obtained a
decree of separate maintenance from him and the husband has
in good faith attempted a reconciliation which she has refused
and continues to refuse,' 7 but he cannot do this if she has obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro.

"The action for separate maintenance and the action for divorce
mensa et thoro are not the same, as the former has for its object the
compelling of a husband who has wilfully deserted or abandoned his
wife or who has committed acts that would give cause for an action for
an absolute divorce to provide support for his wife and children. The
judgment does not expressly authorize the wife to live separately and
apart from her husband. That is probably what happens, but, if so, it
is not under the sanction of a court decree, whereas under a decree of
separation from bed and board the refusal of the wife to cohabit with
the husband is so sanctioned and authorized.""'

It is not known whether the Colorado courts would
make this distinction. A reading of the cases leads me to believe that they have seen no difference between the two actions
or that such distinction was never called to their attention. "
Certainly the Colorado legislature saw no distinction,"'
for the '33 statute,2" "An act relating to marriage and divorce," reads: Section 1. "An action for separate maintenance (divorce from bed and board) [sic] may be maintained
by a wife."
"Williams v. Williams, 265 P. 87, 61 A. L. R. 1264.
"Appleton v. Appleton, 97 Wash. 199, 166 Pac. 61.
"Williams v. Williams, supra.
"Although the point was not really raised in Austin v. Austin, 42 Colo. 130, the
language of the court there seems to imply that such distinction does not exist. There
the court finds that a decree of separate maintenance "is not objectionable as leaving the
question of reconciliation entirely in the wife's bands." (Objection was not made below.) From which it follows that a wife could live apart from her husband as long
as she wished, even though he desired a reconciliation, without being guilty of desertion.
In re Popejoy 26 Colo. 32, says a wife may seek alimony "even though she does
not wish separation from the bonds of matrimony." (a vinculo) A statement that could
have been made were the court distinguishing divorce from bed and board from a divorce
from the bonds of matrimony. See also the cases cited in note 12.
lSAAn additional factor to support this contention is that the action for separate
maintenance when previously mentioned has always been as part of a divorce statute
with no separate mention in title.
"S. L. '33 chap. 72, C. S. A. chap. 56, sections 25-32.
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It seems quite possible that the 1933 statute, as it relates
to separate maintenance," merely sets out the judge-made law
of Colorado. But it is submitted that this is not wise or forward-looking legislation. It places in our statutory law something that might better be forgotten.
If we must have such a divorce, the law should provide
for a merger of the decree after a certain time into one of absolute divorce in case there is no reconciliation. The promotion
of reconciliation seems to be the only sensible basis for limited
divorce2 and this can just as easily be obtained under an interlocutory decree of divorce a vinculo1 3 But we do not need
such a divorce, and Colorado would be stepping forward if she
abolished it.
'The statute also provides that the courts shall have power to specifically enforce
marriage settlement and separate maintenance agreements whether the parties thereto are
divorced or not. Many husbands and wives will separate no matter what the law.
Therefore as a matter of practical policy it seems proper to give legal sanction to fair
agreements relating to support and property rights.
'But Colorado law, C. S. A. chap. 56, sec. 25 (b)-a
wife may maintain the
action if she has been abandoned "and a reconciliation is not probable."
This may well be the basis of West Virginia's action in repealing its statute allowing limited divorce (1931) . West Virginia had before that time allowed such merger.
Louisiana provides (see Vernier, supra, p. 422, and 1938 supplement p. 76)
that where there has been no reconciliation after the expiration of one year from the
obtaining of the decree of limited divorce, the successful party may apply for an absolute
divorce. The party against whom the limited divorce was obtained may apply for an
absolute divorce after one year and sixty days from the obtaining of the decree of limited
divorce. But in Louisiana a limited divorce is a necessary prelude to an absolute divorce
and is really in the nature of an interlocutory decree. Since Colorado has such: it is
submitted that there is no need here for a limited divorce, even though made just and
fair as in Louisiana.

THE COLORADO VIEW ON ALTERATION OF
TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS
By MARVIN L. BROWN and EUGENE SCHAETZEL, School of

Law, 1939, Denver University
HIS discussion will be limited to a consideration of the
legal effect of alterations made in a will after its execution
by the testator, in the absence of a re-execution in statutory manner. • For the purpose of discussion there shall be
presumed previous proof that any change was made by the
testator, himself, and not by some other person. Obviously,
there is no concern over alteration of an holographic will, but

